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RECENT CASES
CUSTOMS SEARCHES OF INTERNATIONAL
IN-TRANSIT CARGO
United States v. Feld
514 F.Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
The United States of America indicted four' alleged cocaine
traffickers, charging violations of federal narcotics laws arising out of
the seizure of more than seventeen pounds of cocaine at John F.
Kennedy Airport on December 10, 1980. The defendants were
charged with conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 2 by conspir-
ing to import "into the United States from places outside" and to
distribute, cocaine. Three of the defendants were additionally
charged with: (1) possession of cocaine at Kennedy Airport with intent
to distribute; (2) importation of a controlled substance into the United
States from Bolivia, South America; and (3) possessing cocaine on
board an aircraft, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955.3 Defendants moved
to dismiss the indictment. As international in-transit passengers, they
asserted that the suitcases containing the cocaine were not subject to
the clearance regulations of United States Customs and in fact were
not presented to customs. At issue were two questions: (1) whether
this circumstance of non-presentment rendered the district court with-
out jurisdiction to proceed on the indictment; and (2) whether the
indictment failed to charge a violation of the laws of the United
States. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York denied defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment.
United States v. Feld, 514 F.Supp. 283 (1981).
In November 1980, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency
(hereinafter "DEA") received an anonymous tip that defendants were
planning to smuggle a large quantity of cocaine from La Paz, Bolivia
to Munich, Germany via Kennedy Airport, in New York. Two of the
defendants were to board the plane in La Paz with the cocaine
concealed in suitcases and two other defendants were to board in New
York. On the New York to Munich leg of the flight, the luggage claim
checks were to be switched so that when the luggage was presented to
German customs, it would appear that the cocaine-bearing suitcases
1. Miciala Evans, one of five individuals originally charged, was deceased at the
time of the hearing.
2. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1975, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) (1978).
3. Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. § 955 (1970).
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belonged to passengers coming from New York and not from Bolivia,
a known source-country for cocaine. After the flight landed in New
York, passengers were escorted to a nearby in-transit lounge. They
were not permitted to leave the lounge area and were not required to
pass through United States Customs prior to continuation of their
international flight. Meanwhile, Customs inspectors removed the in-
transit luggage from the airplane and, after a search, found the
cocaine. The two defendants in the in-transit lounge were then ar-
rested, as were the two defendants waiting to board the plane.
The district court first considered whether it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter where the offense, in its entirety, did not occur
within United States boundaries. The court declared that, contrary to
defendants' assertions, it was not necessary that the entire offense
charged be commited within the court's jurisdiction for it to be able to
adjudicate the matter; a sovereign has jurisdiction to prosecute an
offense where only part of the offense is committed within its bounda-
ries. The court cited United States v. Busic, 4 in which defendants were
charged under the Antihijacking Act of 19745 with the aggravated
offense of aircraft piracy resulting in the death of another person. The
Busic court held that only the underlying offense of aircraft piracy
need have occurred within the statutorily created area of federal
jurisdiction; once that had been established, the court would then
have jurisdiction to try defendants for a death resulting from the air
piracy, regardless of where the death occurred. In the instant case,
since at least one part of each charged offense- formation of the
conspiracy as well as overt acts in furtherance of it, at Kennedy
Airport, constructive possession of a controlled substance at the air-
port, and, importation of cocaine-was committed within the territo-
rial limits of the United States, the court had jurisdiction to proceed
over the charges.
The court next addressed the question of whether defendants
could be charged with possession of cocaine on board an aircraft
within the United States where the cocaine was loaded on the airplane
in Bolivia, and, according to defendants' plan, would have remained
in the "sterile" in-transit baggage area, without being presented to
United States Customs. Defendants would only regain actual posses-
sion of the cocaine in Germany. The court determined that defend-
ants had constructive possession of the cocaine under the test formu-
lated in United States v. Boney. 6 The Boney test provided that a
4. 592 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1978).
5. Antihijacking Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)(3) (1974).
6. 572 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1978).
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person with actual possession of goods, who thereafter shipped them
to a purchaser on a carrier of his choice via a bill of lading, retained
constructive possession of the shipped goods until their delivery to the
purchaser. By analogy, in the instant case, defendants retained con-
structive possession of the cocaine by placing it in luggage to be
shipped on Lufthansa Airlines, with claim checks to be used to re-
trieve the bags at the destination point. The Feld court concluded that
the fact government agents removed the luggage from the plane to the
airline baggage room did not impair defendants' constructive posses-
sion of the cocaine-bearing suitcases. Concluding its discussion of
jurisdiction, the court found it had jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants where the defendants were arrested during the progress of
the crimes alleged, where these crimes took place within the territorial
limits of the United States.
The court next considered whether the indictment failed to state
crimes against the United States. Defendants first argued that there
was no "importation" as a matter of law under 21 U.S.C. § 952(a).7
This statute provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful to import into the customs territory of the
United States . .. from any place outside thereof (but within the
United States), or to import into the United States from any place
outside thereof, any controlled substance . . . or narcotic
drug.. .
The court defined "customs territory of the United States" by referring
to the Tariff Schedules of the United States9 which provide that
"customs territory" includes only "the States, the District of Colum-
bia, and Puerto Rico.""' Since it was uncontested that Kennedy
Airport is within the territorial limits of New York State and of the
United States, defendants made no claim that the search and seizure
was illegal because conducted in some area expressly excluded by 19
U.S.C. § 1202. Rather, defendants argued that the cocaine could not
be deemed to be "imported" within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a)
because, given the circumstances, it was highly improbable the co-
caine would remain in "customs territory" of the United States.
7. Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. § 952(a)(1970).
8. Id.
9. Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act of 1965, 19 U.S.C. §1202
(1965).
10. CJ. Hawaiian Independent Refinery v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1249
(Cust. Ct. 1978) (Customs territory of the United States does not encompass statuto-
rily excluded "'free trade zone").
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Defendants additionally argued that the "imported" term in 21
U.S.C. § 952(a) should not be construed to include their activity
because the cocaine was concealed in and remained in the luggage of a
"true in-transit [international] passenger." Defendants in the instant
case fit squarely into the "true in-transit" category established in
United States v. Pentapati:" they never sought to nor were they
required to clear through United States Customs before continuing
their journey. The court brushed aside defendants' assertions, stating
that defendants had not cited nor had the court found, any case
applying what the defendants termed the "Pentapati exception."
Rather, the court held that there was no requirement that a controlled
substance actually clear customs in order to be deemed illegally "im-
ported." This was so, stated the court, because under 21 U.S.C.
§ 952(a), it was the fact of bringing a controlled substance into United
States territory which constituted "importation," and not what the
importer intended to subsequently do with the drug. Additionally, the
court noted, even if defendants had neither the intention nor the
capability of remaining in the United States with the drug, since
under applicable air commerce regulations, international air traffic
must receive clearance from United States Customs to both land at
and depart from Kennedy Airport, it would be difficult to say that the
on-board luggage was never brought under the control of customs
authorities.
The court next considered defendants' contention that no inten-
tion to distribute narcotics within the United States had been demon-
strated. Citing United States v. Waller,12 the court stated that this
issue should not be determined by the court on a motion to dismiss.
The Waller court, in affirming a conviction for distribution of heroin,
referred to 21 U.S.C. § 802 (8) and (11) 13 which define distribution as
the delivery of a controlled substance via "actual, constructive, or
attempted transfer of the substance."1 4 Accordingly, a constructive
transfer of a controlled substance constitutes distribution under 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Since the facts of the case at bar permitted the
inference that such a constructive transfer might have taken place
within United States airspace, the question of whether defendants
intended to distribute the cocaine within the United States was better
left to a jury. In any event the plain language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
11. 484 F.2d 450, 451 (5th Cir. 1973).
12. 503 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975).
13. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1975, 21 U.S.C. §§ 802 (8), (11) (1978).
14. Id.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
imposed no additional requirement of "intent" to distribute narcotics
within the United States. 5 The statute simply provides, in relevant
part: . .. it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally . . (1) to . . . distribute ... a controlled sub-
stance .... "
Finally, the court noted that the United States is a party to the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,"' which provides a multina-
tional framework to fight international narcotics traffic, including the
distribution of cocaine. The Single Convention must be implemented
through the constitutions and statutes of party nations. The court
stated that congressional enactments such as 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 952,
and 955 were among those penal statutes through which Congress
sought to fulfill United States treaty obligations under the Single
Convention.17 In light of this clear legislative intent, the court stated
that adopting defendants' interpretation of the requisite "intent to
distribute" and their construction of "importation" would thwart a
clear congressional purpose and allow American nationals to make a
sham of United States narcotics laws by using United States territory
as a way-station in the international transportation of dangerous
drugs.
This case is significant because it is a case of first impression. The
one significant difference in this case from others in which these penal
statutes have been held to apply is that these defendants were "in-
transit passengers" in the pure sense and their cargo was on United
States territory only through the happenstance of an airline refuelling
stop. In other cases in which these statutes have been applied, the
parties affirmatively sought to enter the United States and presented
themselves and their cargo to United States Customs for that purpose.
A broad construction of these statutes opens the door to United States
Customs search and seizure of all in-transit luggage and cargo as well
as to that cargo specifically destined for the United States. There is
nothing in the court's opinion which limits customs officials to search
only for contraband substances. Thus, an expansion of this United
15. The court cited United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 380 (1978) for the
proposition that where Congress has conveyed its purpose clearly in a statute, the
court should construe it according to its plain language and decline to manufacture
ambiguity where none exists.
16. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, ratified by United
States 1967, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298.
17. United States v. La Froscia, 354 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485
F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468
F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 985 (1972).
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States customs policy, endorsed by American courts, could have a
marked impact on the flow of foreign-made goods which are presently
routed through United States territory in transit to a final foreign
destination.
SARA R. ROBINSON
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE MARIJUANA
ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT
United States v. James-Robinson et al.
515 F.Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
The United States indicted the foreign crewmen of a stateless
vessel for the alleged violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955(a), popularly known
as the "Marijuana on the High Seas Act."' The statute makes it
unlawful for any person on board a vessel on the high seas subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States to possess a controlled substance
with the intent to distribute the substance.
2
Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that
the United States District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under the international law of jurisdiction. Defendants also argued
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. At the hearing on the
motion to dismiss, the United States and the defendants stipulated to
the facts to be used for the purposes of the hearing. It was agreed that
the defendants were citizens of Colombia, and that the ship on which
they were arrested was a vessel without nationality. 3  It was also
1. United States v. James-Robinson, et al., 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) was intended to improve the Coast Guard's ability to
enforce laws aimed at stopping illegal drug trafficking on the high seas. It provides
criminal penalties for possession of controlled substances on the high seas, and fills
that statutory void created when the Comprehensive Drug Abuse, Prevention, and
Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 846, inadvertantly repealed the criminal provisions
under which drug smugglers apprehended on the high seas had been prosecuted.
Until the enactment of 21 U.S.C. § 955, prosecutors were forced to charge violators
with either attempted unlawful importation or conspiracy, and the evidence neces-
sary to support a conviction on these charges was frequently impossible to obtain. S.
REP. No. 96-855, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 2785-86.
3. The United States can claim jurisdiction over a stateless vessel in accordance
with the Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6, para. 2, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, which provides that a ship sailing under
the flag of two or more states, according to convenience, may not claim any of the
nationalities with respect to any other state, and may be treated as a ship without a
nationality.
